Comments on: Love, Free Will, and the Uselessness of Art http://aarongervais.com/blog/love-free-will-and-the-uselessness-of-art/ Website for composer Aaron Gervais Mon, 20 Feb 2012 17:23:00 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: Aaron Helgeson http://aarongervais.com/blog/love-free-will-and-the-uselessness-of-art/comment-page-1/#comment-9 Aaron Helgeson Sat, 28 Apr 2007 20:31:17 +0000 http://aarongervais.com/wp/?p=616#comment-9 At the same time, just because something is biologically or genetically motivated doesn't mean that it must, or even should, be so. It only means that we have a certain predisposition to it, and that to move beyond that particular predisposition we must find a way to appeal to our other predispositions. For example, the celibacy of priests in many major religions would seem to have no evolutionary advantage whatsoever. However, it serves a major purpose in the theological underpinnings of those faiths. In that sense, the predisposition to believe in a power greater than ourselves compensates for the predisposition to add to the gene pool. This, of course, begs the question of whether faith itself is biologically motivated, and I think that still remains to be seen. Of course, perhaps as we see the decline of at least the absolutism of religion in contemporary industrial society (a less loaded label, perhaps, than "modern"), we also see the decline of this kind of complication between biological and cultural predispositions in those societies. This would support your claim that "art...relies on free will," but it raises another important question in response to your position - namely, whether the concept of free will has been motivated solely by religion or whether it has been motivated by some other force. It's also important to point out that the "progress to higher and higher forms of art," the "historically short-lived interest in high art," the fact that "art...relies absolutely on free will," and even the distinction of "high and low" art are all particular to a certain culture at a certain time in a certain place. This is important, firstly, because it admits that we* have done a lot of work to produce that situation, but also because it makes a claim for biological underpinnings a little more complicated than one would admit at first glance. Would an "abstract musical venture" in our society* be abstract in a different one? Indeed, what is an "abstract musical venture" in the first place? Since all things are produced out of some sort of concrete circumstances, can anything be truly abstract? *"We" and "our society" refer here simply to those cultures who think about, consume, and classify music in the ways you have described, without seeking to dictate precisely the members that belong to those cultures. At the same time, just because something is biologically or genetically motivated doesn’t mean that it must, or even should, be so. It only means that we have a certain predisposition to it, and that to move beyond that particular predisposition we must find a way to appeal to our other predispositions. For example, the celibacy of priests in many major religions would seem to have no evolutionary advantage whatsoever. However, it serves a major purpose in the theological underpinnings of those faiths. In that sense, the predisposition to believe in a power greater than ourselves compensates for the predisposition to add to the gene pool. This, of course, begs the question of whether faith itself is biologically motivated, and I think that still remains to be seen.

Of course, perhaps as we see the decline of at least the absolutism of religion in contemporary industrial society (a less loaded label, perhaps, than “modern”), we also see the decline of this kind of complication between biological and cultural predispositions in those societies. This would support your claim that “art…relies on free will,” but it raises another important question in response to your position – namely, whether the concept of free will has been motivated solely by religion or whether it has been motivated by some other force.

It’s also important to point out that the “progress to higher and higher forms of art,” the “historically short-lived interest in high art,” the fact that “art…relies absolutely on free will,” and even the distinction of “high and low” art are all particular to a certain culture at a certain time in a certain place. This is important, firstly, because it admits that we* have done a lot of work to produce that situation, but also because it makes a claim for biological underpinnings a little more complicated than one would admit at first glance. Would an “abstract musical venture” in our society* be abstract in a different one? Indeed, what is an “abstract musical venture” in the first place? Since all things are produced out of some sort of concrete circumstances, can anything be truly abstract?

*”We” and “our society” refer here simply to those cultures who think about, consume, and classify music in the ways you have described, without seeking to dictate precisely the members that belong to those cultures.

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